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The inductive reasoning test aptly titled, “The Duck Test,” 
provides, “if it walks like a duck, swims like a duck, and quacks like a 
duck, it’s a duck.”1  Judge George Wu echoed this humorous sentiment 
in Fox TV Stations, Inc. v. Aereokiller (“FilmOn Cal”) holding that 
FilmOn, an Internet-based retransmission service, was a cable service 
as defined by 17 U.S.C § 111(f)(3) of the Copyright Act of 1976 
(Copyright Act).2  Judge Wu did not rely on the legislative history or 
                                                                                                             
 1 See, e.g., GE Betz, Inc. v. Zee Co., 718 F.3d 615, 630 (7th Cir. 2013) (citations 
omitted) (determining whether “a participant in a judicial proceeding [that] has all the 
qualities of a defendant . . . [is], in fact, [] a defendant.”); BMC Indus. v. Barth Indus., 160 
F.3d 1322, 1338 n. 28 (11th Cir. 1998) (The “duck test” has received wide support from 
the courts.). 
 2 Fox TV Stations, Inc. v. Aereokiller, 115 F. Supp 3d 1152, 1167 (C.D. Cal. 2015) 
[hereinafter FilmOn Cal] (“[I]t is difficult to recognize the ambiguity the Second Circuit 
saw in the statute, at least as applied to the facts of this case.”). 
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agency opinions—unlike the Second Circuit3—nor did he wax 
philosophical concerning whether the Internet is a tangible place—
unlike the District Court for the District of Columbia.4  Instead, Judge 
Wu based his opinion on the plain language of the law and used 
common sense to determine a facility in this context. 
This comment focuses on the recent opinions of the Second 
Circuit, Central District of California, and District of Columbia District 
Court, in regards to Internet retransmission services (sometimes 
referred to as “Internet TV”).  The issue in all three cases was whether 
an Internet retransmission system, which streams copyrighted 
television programming live and over the Internet, could qualify as a 
cable system for purposes of section 111 of the Copyright Act and, 
therefore, be eligible to obtain a “compulsory license” to retransmit 
broadcast signals.5  To put it concisely, the issue boils down to whether 
an Internet retransmission service is a cable system. The Copyright Act 
defines a cable system as follows: 
[A] facility, located in any State . . . that in whole or in part 
receives signals transmitted or programs broadcast by one or 
more television broadcast stations licensed by the FCC, and 
makes secondary transmissions of such signals or programs 
by wires, cables, microwave, or other communications 
channels to subscribing members of the public who pay for 
such service.6   
Parties that fall within this definition are eligible for a compulsory 
license granted by section 111.  A compulsory license is “[a] statutorily 
created license that allows certain parties to use copyrighted material 
without the explicit permission of the copyright owner in exchange for 
a special royalty.”7  Therefore, a compulsory license granted by section 
111 allows a cable system, without the express consent of any 
copyright owner, to retransmit broadcast television programming to its 
subscribers for a statutorily imposed fee and subject to several 
regulations.8  This is a useful tool for cable companies because it 
permits them to transmit copyrighted content without spending anytime 
negotiating for licenses. 
                                                                                                             
 3 WPIX, Inc. v. IVI, Inc., 691 F.3d 275 (2d Cir. 2012) [hereinafter Ivi II]. 
 4 Fox TV Stations, Inc. v. Filmon X LLC, 150 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C. 2015) 
[hereinafter FilmOn DC]. 
 5 Ivi II, 691 F.3d at 279. 
 6 17 U.S.C. § 111(f)(3) (2015). 
 7 Compulsory License, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1060 (10th ed. 2014). 
 8 Ivi II, 691 F.3d at 278. 
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A. Potential Effect of FilmOn Cal 
The differences of opinion between FilmOn Cal, Ivi II, and 
FilmOn DC, center around two Internet retransmission companies—
Ivi and FilmOn.  During their trials, each company argued that its 
particular system was a cable system for purposes of section 111(c).9 
By applying Chevron deference,10 the Second Circuit held in Ivi 
II that Ivi was not a cable system for two reasons.11  First, the legislative 
history of section 111 suggests that an Internet retransmission company 
is not a cable company because: (1) Congress never expressly amended 
section 111 to apply to Internet retransmission services, and (2) 
Congress enacted the provision to address the difficulties of providing 
television reception by enabling the expansion of cable systems on a 
localized, rather than nationwide, platform—a purpose that Ivi was not 
seeking to address.12  Second, the court adopted the agency’s 
interpretation of a cable system, which expressly excludes Internet 
retransmission services, under step two of Chevron deference.13 
In FilmOn Cal, Judge Wu declined to follow the Second Circuit 
and ruled in favor of Internet retransmission services, determining it is 
a cable system under section 111(c).  Judge Wu held that FilmOn 
should be considered a cable system so long as it can show that its 
system meets other specific requirements, such as satisfying 
localization requirements and complying with applicable Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) regulations.14  Although the case 
is pending an appeal in the Ninth Circuit, FilmOn has claimed that its 
new system—the Lanner System15—has improved localization 
services and will placate the Copyright Office and broadcasters’ 
concerns.16 
                                                                                                             
 9 Ivi II, 691 F.3d at 279; FilmOn Cal, 115 F. Supp. 3d at 1155–56; FilmOn DC, 150 
F. Supp. 3d at 23. 
 10 A strong form of agency deference, courts will apply it when dealing with an 
ambiguous statute that an agency has issued a formal rulemaking on.  Chevron deference 
instructs a court to first examine legislative history to determine a statute’s intent.  If still 
no affirmative intent can be gathered, courts are then to defer to an agency’s interpretation 
of the statute, so long as it is reasonable.  See infra Part II.C(i); Part III.A. 
 11 Ivi II, 691 F.3d at 277. 
 12 Id. at 281–83. 
 13 Id. at 281–85. 
 14 FilmOn Cal, 115 F. Supp. 3d at 1171. 
 15 Id. at 1156. 
 16 Id. at 1156–58; Margaret Harding McGill, FilmOn CEO Prods FCC to Bring Local 
Broadcast TV Online, LAW360 (Oct. 9, 2015, 7:24 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles
/713112/filmon-ceo-prods-fcc-to-bring-local-broadcast-tv-online (FilmOn has expressed 
its willingness to abide by any applicable FCC regulations and has recently spoken to the 
FCC about the issue). 
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Analyzing the very same definition that Ivi II and FilmOn Cal 
addressed, the court in FilmOn DC agreed with Ivi II’s outcome, but 
for different reasons.  The DC District Court believed FilmOn is not a 
cable system because it uses the Internet, a pathway that it does not 
control, to retransmit content to subscribers.17 Additionally, the DC 
District Court applied Skidmore deference, a lesser form of deference 
than Chevron.18  The court found the Copyright Office’s interpretation 
persuasive, and for this reason denied FilmOn a compulsory license.19 
B. Solution Summary 
This comment argues that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
should affirm the FilmOn Cal decision and create a circuit split because 
the district court properly defined a cable system under the Copyright 
Act and FilmOn’s system fits within said definition. 
Part II of this comment will do the following: (1) summarize the 
history of cable systems and the compulsory license; (2) analyze the 
legislative intent behind the license; (3) provide an in-depth analysis of 
Ivi II, FilmOn Cal, FilmOn DC, and other related cases; and (4) discuss 
the philosophy that presently underlies the compulsory license.  Part III 
will explain why the Ninth Circuit should affirm the FilmOn Cal 
decision and break with the Second Circuit and DC District Court. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. History: From Satellites on Hilltops to TV on Your Lap 
i. The Traditional Cable Systems 
The compulsory license emerged in response to two Supreme 
Court decisions from 1968 and 1974 that allowed cable systems to 
retransmit copyrighted work to the masses without having to pay 
anything to rights holders.20  The Court held in Fortnightly Corp. v. 
United Artists Television, Inc. that the first cable systems’ 
retransmissions did not constitute copyright infringement because the 
companies were not performing.  The Court reasoned the cable system 
                                                                                                             
 17 FilmOn DC, 150 F. Supp. 3d at 19. 
 18 A lesser form of agency deference than Chevron deference, courts will “look to the 
degree of [an] agency’s care, its consistency, formality, and relative expertness, and to the 
persuasiveness of the agency’s position,” when reviewing.  FilmOn DC, 150 F. Supp. 3d 
1, 25–26 (D.D.C. 2015). 
 19 FilmOn DC, 150 F. Supp. 3d at 27–29. 
 20 These decisions referred to cable systems as Community Antenna Television 
(CATV) systems.  Courts and academics now refer to CATV systems as cable systems. 
ABC, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2505 (2014) [hereinafter Aereo III]. 
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functioned more like a viewer than a broadcaster.21 As cable systems 
evolved, the Supreme Court determined in Teleprompter v. Columbia 
Broad. Sys. that cable systems new features (e.g., their own 
broadcasting channels and selling commercial space) were still non-
infringing and allowed cable systems “to compete more effectively 
with broadcasters for the television market.”22  Fortnightly and 
Teleprompter essentially authorized cable systems “to retransmit 
broadcast television programming without incurring any costs to the 
copyright owners.”23 
ii. The Copyright Act of 1976 
Congress amended the Copyright Act in order to better respect the 
rights of copyright holders and ensure they received fair compensation 
for their works.24  Congress enacted section 111(c) compulsory license, 
requiring cable systems to pay copyright owners to retransmit the 
owners’ content.25  Through this statute, Congress overturned 
Fortnightly and Teleprompter, declaring cable systems’ 
retransmissions to be performances and requiring cable systems pay a 
fee to retransmit such performances to the public.26  The compulsory 
license balances two ideals: (1) the societal benefit cable systems 
provide (i.e., expansive access to television programming), and (2) the 
significance of respecting one’s property rights.27  Further, Congress 
passed the statute to combat the undue burden of requiring cable 
systems to negotiate with each and every copyright owner to retransmit 
broadcast signals.28  The license is conditioned on reporting 
requirements, payment of royalties, a ban on the substitution or deletion 
of commercials, and geographical limitations on the license for 
programs broadcasted by Canadian or Mexican stations.29 
iii. Satellites 
Not long after the amendments to the Copyright Act, satellite 
companies entered the retransmission market, requesting compulsory 
                                                                                                             
 21 Id. 
 22 Id. 
 23 WPIX, Inc. v. Ivi, Inc., 765 F. Supp. 2d 594, 602 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) [hereinafter Ivi 
I]. 
 24 Aereo III, 134 S. Ct. at 2506. 
 25 Ivi II, 691 F.3d 275, 278 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 26 Aereo III, 134 S. Ct. at 2505. 
 27 See Ivi II, 691 F.3d at 282; U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, SATELLITE HOME 
VIEWER EXTENSION AND REAUTHORIZATION ACT SECTION 109 REPORT 1, 3 (2008). 
 28 H.R. REP. 94-1476, at 5569, 5704 (1976). 
 29 Id. at 5704. 
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licenses.  In Nat’l Broad. Co. v. Satellite Broad. Networks, Inc., the 
Eleventh Circuit held that satellite carriers qualified as cable systems 
under section 111 and were entitled to compulsory licenses.30  The 
United States Copyright Office (the “Copyright Office” or the 
“Office”) had an issue with this decision because the localized intent 
of the compulsory license was not meant to apply to national 
retransmission services and the FCC does not regulate satellites.31 
In response, Congress enacted the Satellite Home Viewer Act, 
which denied satellite carriers a section 111(c) compulsory license, but 
provided them with a separate statutory license.32  In 1998 Congress 
enacted 17 U.S.C. § 122, authorizing satellite carriers—once criticized 
for supporting a nationwide service—to retransmit local broadcast 
programming back into a local market.33  Congress has actively 
legislated in this area, amending section 122 five times since 2002.34 
iv. Internet Retransmission Services: The Aereo Decision 
The most recent development within this area of law is Aereo III, 
where the Supreme Court determined that an Internet-based 
retransmission service publicly performs through its retransmissions of 
copyright owners’ content.35  This is significant because it requires 
Internet retransmission services to obtain a license from copyright 
holders in order to retransmit content. 
Aereo—which is now defunct—provided retransmissions of TV 
broadcasts through thousands of small antennas, each of which were 
attributed to a single, active Aereo subscriber at any time (i.e., no two 
Aereo subscribers would be assigned the same antenna at once).36  The 
subscriber first selected a channel for Aereo’s services to translate into 
data that could be used over the Internet.37  The data was saved to one 
of Aereo’s servers and retransmitted to that individual’s computer for 
streaming.38  If two subscribers clicked to view the same programming 
at the same time, they would each receive an individual copy made for 
him or her, but of the same material.39 
                                                                                                             
 30 Nat’l Broad. Co. v. Satellite Broad. Networks, Inc., 940 F.2d 1467, 1471 (11th Cir. 
1991). 
 31 57 Fed. Reg. 3284 (1992) (codified at 37 C.F.R. § 201.17). 
 32 See 17 U.S.C. § 119(2015); 56 Fed. Reg. 31, 580 (1991); 57 Fed. Reg. 3283 (1992). 
 33 FilmOn DC, 150 F. Supp. 3d 1, 20 (D.D.C. 2015). 
 34 FilmOn Cal, 115 F. Supp. 3d 1152, 1161 (C.D. Cal. 2015). 
 35 Aereo III, 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2511 (2014). 
 36 Id. at 2503. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. 
114 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 13:107 
Aereo’s main argument paralleled the arguments made by the 
cable systems in Fortnightly and Teleprompter.40  Aereo argued that it 
does not publicly perform the copyright, but rather provides equipment; 
any performance that may occur happens at the hands of the 
subscriber.41  If the Court agreed that Aereo’s retransmissions did not 
constitute a public performance, then Aereo would not be infringing 
the copyrights of the content it displayed. Additionally, Aereo argued 
that it only created and retransmitted personal copies of the content to 
its subscribers because there was only one active subscriber for any one 
antenna.42  The Supreme Court disagreed, ruling: (1) Aereo was not 
just an equipment provider because its systems perform copyrighted 
material, and (2) Aereo performs when it publicly displays “the same 
contemporaneous[] [programming to multiple people],” despite its 
“personal copies” assertion.43  Therefore, Internet retransmission 
services, like Aereo, publicly perform when they retransmit 
copyrighted works.  Absent a license from the proper rights holders, 
such retransmissions infringe on the copyright holders’ rights. 
In its opinion, the Supreme Court noted Aereo’s system bore an 
“overwhelming likeness to the cable companies targeted by the 1976 
amendments” and stated an Internet-based service’s overall 
commercial objective is no different than a cable companies.44  Further, 
at oral argument, Justice Sonia Sotomayer stated, “I look at the 
definition of a cable company, and [Aereo] seems to fit.”45 
Using these comments, Aereo raised a new argument on remand 
in the Southern District of New York (SDNY): the comparisons laid 
out in the opinion and Justice Sotomayer’s statements held, or at the 
very least inferred, Aereo was a cable system.46  In a short opinion, the 
court dismissed the notion that such statements or comments could 
have any legal effect and that the analogies made between cable 
systems and the CATV systems were only for the purposes of finding 
Aereo to publicly perform.47  The court stated that simply because 
                                                                                                             
 40 Id. at 2511. 
 41 Aereo III, 134 S. Ct. at 2504. 
 42 Id. at 2508–09. 
 43 Id. at 2506, 2510. 
 44 Id. at 2508. 
 45 Joe Mullin, Analysis: New motions show gaping holes in Supreme Court’s Aereo 
ruling, ARS TECHNICA (Aug. 4, 2014, 4:52 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/
2014/08/aereo-tells-court-its-bleeding-to-death-but-gets-no-relief/. 
 46 ABC v. Aereo, Inc., 12-cv-1540, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 150555, at *17 (S.D.N.Y. 
Oct. 23, 2014) [hereinafter Aereo IV] (several other failed defenses were raised). 
 47 Id. at *19–20 (“ . . . only the Justices’ written opinions have the force of law.”). 
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Aereo was found to perform publicly does not render it a cable 
system.48 
B. Congress and the Copyright Office on the Compulsory License 
i. Legislative Intent 
Congress created section 111 to balance the societal benefits a 
cable system provides to the viewing public, with a copyright holders 
interest in their work.49  Further, Congress was aware of the 
impracticality of requiring a potential cable system to negotiate with 
every individual copyright owner whose work it wished to retransmit.50  
In order to address these competing interests, Congress created a 
statutorily defined royalty.51 
ii. The Copyright Office’s Interpretation 
The Copyright Office does not believe Internet retransmission 
services should qualify for a compulsory license.52  It considers some 
differences, such as the nature of delivery, to be fundamental and urge 
the withholding of a license.53  Its principal concern, however, is 
whether Internet retransmissions can be controlled geographically.54  
The localization requirement serves several ends, such as allowing 
broadcasters to sell advertising space based on region and appropriately 
deliver content to viewers in different time zones.55  Despite this view, 
Verizon and AT&T have obtained compulsory licenses for their 
respective TV services despite their utilization of Internet Protocol.56 
The Copyright Office first examined the issue presented by 
Internet retransmission services in 1999, determining that it was too 
early to grant the services a compulsory license.  In subsequent years, 
the Copyright Office has made clear its position that Internet 
                                                                                                             
 48 Id. at *18. 
 49 Ivi II, 691 F.3d 275, 281 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 50 See supra Part II.A (The Copyright Act of 1976). 
 51 Id. 
 52 Letter from J. Charlesworth, Copyright Office General Counsel (July 23, 2014). 
 53 Statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights, before the Subcommittee on 
Courts and Intellectual Property, Committee on the Judiciary (June 15, 2000). 
 54 Letter from Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights, to the Honorable Howard 
Coble (Nov. 10, 1999) (“Our principal concern is the extent to which Internet 
retransmissions of broadcast signals can be controlled geographically.”). 
 55 Ivi II, 691 F.3d 275, 285 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 56 FilmOn Cal, 115 F. Supp. 3d 1152, 1170 (C.D. Cal. 2015) (citing Ivi I, 765 F. Supp. 
2d 594, 614 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)). 
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retransmission services should not receive compulsory licenses.57  Yet, 
when discussing “new distribution technologies” in a recent report, the 
Copyright Office included the following statement: 
To be clear, the Office is not against new distribution models 
that use Internet protocol to deliver programming, but only 
opposes the circumstance where any online content 
aggregator would have the ability to use a statutory license 
to sidestep private agreements and free from any of the 
limitations imposed on cable operators and satellite carriers 
by the Communications Act and the FCC’s rules.58 
Additionally, the Office has acknowledged that the issues 
presented by such an innovation are entangled with communications 
law and policy issues, the analysis of which is outside its expertise.59 
iii. Current Ideology of the Compulsory License 
Internet retransmission services are not alone from being 
scrutinized by the Copyright Office; the Office actually has a 
longstanding opposition to the compulsory license itself.60  The 
Copyright Office believes the compulsory license allows cable systems 
to carry local signals for a de minimis fee and that a government-
administered license “prevents the marketplace from deciding the fair 
value of copyrighted works.”61 They see negotiation between the 
representatives from the industries involved and users as a better 
solution.62 
C. Ivi II, FilmOn Cal, and FilmOn DC 
This section will discuss the systems and business model of the 
respective Internet retransmission systems of Ivi and FilmOn and will 
further unpack each court’s analysis of the issue.  Finally, it will situate 
the discussion within the greater, national context by examining one 
other case from the SDNY where the same issue arose. 
                                                                                                             
 57 Statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights, before the Subcommittee on 
Courts and Intellectual Property, Committee on the Judiciary (June 15, 2000). 
 58 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, SATELLITE HOME VIEWER EXTENSION AND 
REAUTHORIZATION ACT SECTION 109 REPORT 188 (2008). 
 59 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT ON MARKETPLACE ALTERNATIVES TO REPLACE 
STATUTORY LICENSES (Aug. 29, 2011). 
 60 Statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights, before the Subcommittee on 
Courts and Intellectual Property, Committee on the Judiciary (June 15, 2000). 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. 
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i. Ivi II 
Ivi’s system worked like most cable systems by capturing and 
retransmitting broadcast signals from stations located across the 
country, but it differed in two significant ways: 
(1) Rather than being restricted to one’s local market 
broadcasting, any Ivi subscriber was able to view, without altering his 
or her computer settings, live streams from any local station in New 
York, Los Angeles, Chicago, or Seattle;63 and 
(2) Ivi’s service did not comply with the applicable rules, 
regulations, or authorizations of the FCC.64 
After transmitting the signal to its subscribers, Ivi rendered the 
content unusable and prevented it from being viewed, captured, or 
passed along by its consumers.65 
To determine the statute’s intent, Ivi II applied Chevron 
deference.66  Chevron deference is generally warranted when an 
agency’s interpretation of the statute is available, almost always 
through formal notice.67  Chevron first requires the court to “consider 
whether Congress has clearly spoken on the issue.”68  If such intent is 
clear, no more analysis need be done, but if it appears ambiguous, the 
court must turn to the legislative history to determine the statute’s 
intent.69  If still no affirmative intent can be gathered, step two instructs 
the court to “defer to an agency’s interpretation of the statute, so long 
as it is reasonable.”70 
Applying step one, the court found Congress’s intent unclear.71  
Specifically, the court could not conclude whether Ivi’s “service (1) is 
or utilizes a ‘facility’ (2) that receives and retransmits signals (3) 
through [a prescribed communication channel].”72  Ivi attempted to fit 
within the definition of a cable system. 
Following Chevron deference, the court looked to section 111’s 
legislative history and determined it was intended to address the issues 
of reception and remote access to broadcasting that supports localized, 
                                                                                                             
 63 Ivi I, 765 F. Supp. 2d 594, 598 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 64 Id. at 599. 
 65 Id. at 598. 
 66 Ivi II, 691 F.3d 275, 279 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 67 FilmOn DC, 150 F. Supp. 3d 1, 25 (D.D.C. 2015) (citing United States v. Mead 
Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230–31 (2001)).  
 68 Ivi II, 691 F.3d at 279 (citing Cohen v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., 498 F.3d 111, 116 
(2d Cir. 2007)). 
 69 See id. 
 70 Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 71 See id. at 280. 
 72 Id. (emphasis added). 
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not nationwide, systems.73  This analysis proscribed the compulsory 
license from applying to Ivi’s system because Ivi provided a 
nationwide service.74  To remove any doubt about the validity of its 
interpretation of the statute, the court moved on to step two of the 
Chevron analysis and applied the Copyright Office’s interpretation of 
section 111 as it pertains to Internet retransmission services.75  The 
court sided with the Copyright Office’s interpretation, finding it 
“reasonable and persuasive.”76 
ii. FilmOn Cal 
FilmOn’s retransmission system, referred to as the Lanner system, 
features “a single master antenna on the roof of a commercial data 
center, which routes signals to an antenna box where the signals are 
amplified and captured by small antennas.”77  By selecting a program 
to view from a list on FilmOn’s website, a user’s computer has 
transmitted a signal from FilmOn’s servers via the Internet.78  As a way 
of managing a subscriber’s access to his or her respective local 
channels, FilmOn processes its subscribers’ requests from a local 
facility within a subscriber’s region.79  In anticipation of this trial, 
FilmOn also enhanced its localization services by requiring a user’s 
credit card address, and a viewing device located in the market area of 
which programming it was receiving.80  FilmOn’s system also employs 
a security measure in the form of an “encryption token” that ensures 
the user with the authorized IP address is the only one able to access 
the broadcast stream.81 
FilmOn, unlike Ivi, focused its arguments and efforts leading up 
to litigation on closing the alleged gap between a more traditional cable 
system and its system by implementing the following: 
(1)   FilmOn restarted its operations as a Multichannel Video 
Programming Distributor to better fit within the FCC regulations;82 
                                                                                                             
 73 See supra Part II.A (The Copyright Act of 1976). 
 74 Ivi II, 691 F.3d at 284. 
 75 Id. at 283. 
 76 Id. at 284. See supra Part II.B (ii). 
 77 FilmOn Cal, 115 F. Supp. 3d 1152, 1156 (C.D. Cal. 2015). 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id at 1156–57. 
 81 Id. at 1157. 
 82 Id. at 1159 (“a multichannel video programming distributor (MVPD) is any person 
such as . . . a cable operator, a multichannel multipoint distribution service, a direct 
broadcast satellite service, or a television receive-only satellite program distributor, who 
makes available for purchase, by subscribers or customers, multiple channels of video 
programming”). 
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(2) FilmOn announced—and continues to express—its 
willingness and ability to comply with all applicable regulations, 
including FCC ones;83 and 
(3)    FilmOn’s system employs several localization safeguards to 
ensure subscribers are viewing only their local markets.84 
Proving its eagerness to operate accordingly, FilmOn mailed over 
one hundred letters to broadcasters requesting knowledge of whether 
the broadcasters would elect “must-carry” status as required by FCC 
regulations.85  Additionally, per the Copyright Office’s compulsory 
license requirements, FilmOn submitted to them its statements of 
accounting and paid corresponding fees. 86 
Breaking from Ivi II, the court in FilmOn Cal did not inquire into 
the legislative history or move onto the second step of Chevron because 
it did not have the same questions as Ivi II—the court concluded 
Congress’s definition of a cable system to be clear.87  Namely, Judge 
Wu did not probe whether the Internet is a facility; instead finding 
FilmOn’s buildings that are located wholly in particular states, hosting 
FilmOn’s retransmitting antennas, as the facilities.88  Before any 
content is retransmitted, these physical facilities receive the 
broadcasters’ signals.89  From there, the content is retransmitted via 
“wires, cables, microwave, or other communication channels to the 
corresponding subscribers.”90  Therefore, per the Copyright Act’s 
definition of a cable system, FilmOn maintains and controls the 
facilities that are used for the retransmissions and the operation that in 
fact precedes the Internet in FilmOn’s scheme. 91  Additionally, the 
court held the terms “headends” and “contiguous communities” do not 
have any bearing on the definition of a cable system. 92  Instead, the 
court stated these terms “merely provide[] that certain commonly 
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owned cable systems will be treated as a single system for purposes of 
computing a royalty.”93 
Therefore, due to the unambiguous, express language of 
Congress, the court stopped at the first step of Chevron deference, 
deciding that FilmOn was a cable system and thus entitled to a 
compulsory license granted under section 111.94  No legislative history 
analysis or agency deference would be necessary as stipulated through 
Chevron deference.95  The court added that despite the Copyright 
Office’s refusal to grant compulsory licenses to Internet retransmission 
services, the Office does not have the last say on the matter. 96   Instead 
courts have the option to merely treat the Office’s opinion as persuasive 
in this context.97  The Copyright Office acknowledged it does not have 
the last say when it accepted FilmOn’s payment of statutory fees for 
purposes of section 111, on a provisional basis.98 
iii. FilmOn DC 
FilmOn DC, a concurrent case involving the same parties and 
issue as FilmOn Cal, reached a different result.  While the verdict had 
the same overall outcome as Ivi II, the DC court’s analysis was 
different.99  The court first held that FilmOn’s reliance on the Internet 
rendered it incapable of being a cable system under section 111(f)(3) 
because its physical facilities first retransmit the signals to Internet 
service providers, as opposed to the subscribers directly.100  Despite the 
fact that FilmOn’s system uses “cables, wires, and microwaves,” it 
involves a process that utilizes “a global network of interconnected 
computers.”101  The court interpreted section 111(f)(3) to read, “any 
system that fails to encompass the distribution medium and does not 
retransmit the signals directly to the subscriber does not qualify as a 
cable system.”102  Since FilmOn does not control the entirety of its 
retransmissions path to subscribers, it is not a cable system.103  
Specifically, the court found Internet retransmission systems to differ 
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from the cable systems in 1976 that “controlled the entire transmission 
path leading directly to the subscribers.”104 
The court also denied that the language, “or other communications 
channels” in section 111(c) expressed Congress’s intent for the 
compulsory license to encompass evolving technologies.105 The court 
concluded that the Internet is not similar or of the same kind as “wires, 
cables, or microwaves” because it “operates through nebulous 
international connections in cyberspace thus not constituting a 
‘channel’ similar to ‘wires, cables or microwave.’”106 
Additionally, the court broke from Ivi II by refusing to apply 
Chevron deference due to the absence of any formal rulemaking by the 
Copyright Office.107  Instead, the DC Court applied Skidmore 
deference.108  When determining whether to apply Skidmore deference, 
courts must “look to the degree of [an] agency’s care, its consistency, 
formality, and relative expertness, and to the persuasiveness of the 
agency’s position.”109  The court found that the Copyright Office has 
consistently interpreted section 111(f)(3) to deny that Internet 
retransmission services are cable systems because they are not “an 
inherently localized transmission media of limited availability.”110  The 
court found this interpretation “persuasive because it is grounded in the 
statute’s text and legislative history,” and, therefore, allowed Skidmore 
deference to be applied.111  Due to the Internet’s worldwide 
capabilities, the court held that FilmOn’s system is not inherently 
localized and is inconsistent with the Copyright Office’s 
interpretation.112 
Applying the definition of a cable system to FilmOn’s, the court 
disagreed that the Supreme Court’s analysis in Aereo III rendered the 
statute and the transmit clause “technologically-agnostic”—meaning 
the statute did not refer to types of technology, but only to the broad 
                                                                                                             
 104 Id. at 20–21 (“The Internet also relies on multiple other types of distribution media, 
such as satellite, cellular networks, and wifi”). 
 105 FilmOn DC, 150 F. Supp. 3d at 21–22. 
 106 Id. at 22–23 (“when a statute sets out a series of specific items ending with a general 
term, that general term is confined to covering subjects comparable to the specifics it 
follows”); The court also refused a broad interpretation of “other communication channels” 
because it may violate “international obligation[s].”). 
 107 Id. at 25 (“[T]he Court will not apply Chevron deference in the absence of formal 
rulemaking here because the Copyright Office issued regulations after notice-and-
comment in other situations, such as those concerning satellite carriers.”). 
 108 Id. 
 109 Id. 
 110 Id. at 27. 
 111 FilmOn DC, 150 F. Supp. 3d at 27. 
 112 Id. at 28. 
122 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 13:107 
process of retransmitting signals. 113  The court simply stated that 
although an Internet retransmission service may be similar to cable 
systems in the way it performs, this does not mean it is similar to cable 
systems for all purposes, namely the way it retransmits 
programming.114  Nevertheless, in a footnote, the court acknowledged 
that it too had analogized FilmOn to cable television companies, 
emphasizing the similarities in regards to its “relationship[s] with 
broadcasters such as [the] Plaintiffs.”115 
D. Additional Case Law 
Following Aereo III, FilmOn relied on the comparisons made by 
the Supreme Court between the traditional cable systems in Fortnightly 
and Teleprompter and Internet retransmission systems, arguing that in 
light of such comparisons, FilmOn qualifies as a cable system.116  The 
court disagreed, holding FilmOn placed “too much importance” on the 
Supreme Court’s cable system analogies, and that such analogies were 
“not the same as a judicial finding” that Aereo is a cable system.117  
Further, the court relied on its precedent from Ivi II.118 
E. Current State of the Law 
i. No Movement from Congress 
Unlike with satellite carriers, Congress has yet to codify a 
statutory provision for Internet-based retransmission services, despite 
several courts litigating the issue.119  In addition, despite the well-
documented history of displeasure from the Copyright Office,120 the 
compulsory license remains an integral part in providing broadcasting 
to the public and continues to be relied upon for business arrangements.  
This leaves Internet TV with nowhere to turn but the courts in its fight 
to provide the public with a new, yet familiar way to consume 
broadcasting. 
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ii. FCC Taking Sides? 
The FCC is in the process of creating a proposal to determine 
whether Internet-based services qualify as “multichannel video 
programming distributors” (“MVPD”) under communications law.121  
The proposal would widen the FCC’s interpretation of MVPD to 
include any technology that provides a linear stream or programming 
(i.e., services that provide scheduled TV programming without DVR 
systems).122  Therefore, the outcome of this proposal may very well 
decree Internet retransmission services compatible with FCC 
regulations.  Judge Wu acknowledged this in FilmOn Cal, but stated 
the notice would not affect his decision.123 
III. ANALYSIS 
This section will set out the arguments for why the Ninth Circuit 
should affirm its district court’s decision holding FilmOn’s Internet 
retransmission service to be a cable system for purposes of section 111 
of the Copyright Act.  First, the application of Chevron deference in Ivi 
II is misapplied.  It is not at all obvious that that style of deference was 
warranted as Ivi II’s missing analysis would have one believe.  
Additionally, if any agency deference were to be applied, the Copyright 
Office’s reasoning would not apply to FilmOn’s compatible 
technology.124  Second, Judge Wu provided a straightforward, fair 
reading of section 111(f)(3) and correctly determined that FilmOn’s 
Internet-based service fits well within the definition.125  Finally, the 
Ninth Circuit should take notice of the several analogies made between 
Internet retransmission systems and cable systems throughout the 
several Internet TV opinions; while it may not definitively show that 
the systems are cable systems, it provides further evidence of their 
striking similarities.126 
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A. Agency Deference 
i. The Second Circuit’s Misapplication of Chevron Deference 
By applying Chevron deference, Ivi II held that Ivi was not a cable 
system by considering the legislative history of the compulsory license 
and definition of a cable system.127  To begin this analysis, the Second 
Circuit stated, “the Copyright Office . . . has spoken on the issue of 
whether section 111’s compulsory licenses extend to Internet 
retransmissions.  Accordingly, we utilize [Chevron deference].”128  
This bare assertion, however, is not a correct analysis of the law 
because Chevron deference is not simply warranted merely by an 
agency’s interpretation through administrative statements.129  The 
scope of when Chevron deference may be applied has been limited by 
recent decisions.130  Generally, interpretations that lack the force of law 
do not warrant Chevron deference (e.g., opinion letters, policy 
statements, agency manuals).131  Even though the absence of a final 
regulation is not necessarily determinative, “the overwhelming number 
of cases [that have applied] Chevron deference have reviewed the fruits 
of notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal adjudication.”132 
The Copyright Office, although consistently stating that Internet 
retransmission services should not be entitled to compulsory licensing, 
has never issued regulations formally on the matter.133  The Office’s 
position comes from a collection of statements, policy documents, and 
congressional testimonies.134  FilmOn DC refused to follow Ivi II due 
to the Second Circuit’s failure to explain why Chevron deference was 
warranted.135  While the absence of a final regulation may not be 
determinative, “the Copyright Office [has] issued [formal] 
regulations . . . in other [similar] situations, such as those concerning 
satellite carriers,” but clearly refused here despite its continuing 
statements on the matter.136 
Ivi II was an administrative law decision as much as it was a 
copyright law decision.  Given the Copyright Office’s longstanding 
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opposition to Internet retransmission systems, and the compulsory 
license in general, it is not surprising the Second Circuit ruled against 
Internet retransmission systems.  Chevron deference should not have 
been applied in Ivi II, however,  because of the lack of formal 
rulemaking from the Copyright Office. 
ii. Eliminating the Copyright Office’s Concerns 
Although Ivi II and FilmOn DC did not apply the same degree of 
deference, the two courts still utilized the same set of facts and opinions 
expressed by the Copyright Office.  The Office’s stance on the issue 
expressly rejects the idea that a service such as FilmOn could constitute 
a cable system.137  Utilizing Chevron deference, Ivi II adopted this 
interpretation, while FilmOn DC employing Skidmore deference, 
acknowledged the Office’s views were persuasive.138 
The Copyright Office’s interpretation of section 111 supports the 
notion that to qualify for a compulsory license a cable system must 
retransmit localized content.139  While there should be no doubt to this, 
this was a major concern in Ivi II because Ivi’s service was not at all 
localized, allowing for a subscriber in New York to stream a Seattle 
broadcast.140  FilmOn, however, is the catalyst in this equation because, 
unlike Ivi, FilmOn fully supports localization and plans to prove that 
its system is capable of retransmitting localized broadcasts to the 
appropriate subscribers within its specific region.141  As noted by 
FilmOn Cal and FilmOn DC, FilmOn has implemented several 
measures to ensure its retransmissions are properly localized.142  
Therefore, the Copyright Office’s geographical concern with Internet 
retransmission services in general, as cited by the Ivi II and FilmOn DC 
decisions, will not apply to FilmOn so long as the company can show 
on appeal its service’s proficient localization measures.143 
Another attribute of section 111 is that its “operation . . . hinge[s] 
on the FCC rules regulating the cable industry.”144  Similar to the above 
analysis, FilmOn is not arguing that its will not or cannot comply with 
FCC regulations, as Ivi did.145  Instead, FilmOn understands the 
importance of compliance and has expressed its willingness and 
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capability to observe all appropriate FCC regulations.146  Additionally, 
the Copyright Office has endorsed compulsory licenses to AT&T and 
Verizon for their TV services, despite the systems’ usage of Internet 
Protocol.147  Verizon even brashly advertises across the nation that its 
system is “not cable.”148 
Finally, the FCC is in the process of creating a proposal that would 
allow Internet retransmission services to fall within its regulation.149  
Despite opposition from many of the same plaintiffs in the FilmOn and 
Ivi cases, FCC Chairman Tom Wheeler has recently advocated to 
expand the definition of a cable system from the traditional definition 
utilized by the FCC, to allow for a more competitive market.150 
B. If It Walks Like a Duck . . . 
The Ninth Circuit should affirm the district court’s decision, 
holding FilmOn to be a cable system under the Copyright Act because 
FilmOn operates physical facilities that receive broadcaster signals and 
retransmit those signals; this is to say that the Internet is not the 
receiving “facility,” per section 111(f)(3).  Additionally, providing 
some clarity to a controversial question, FilmOn and its competitors 
mirror cable systems in seemingly every way.151 
i. “If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; 
for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the 
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”152 
Applying the definition of a cable system, Ivi II and FilmOn DC 
both stopped at the same inquiry: Is the Internet a facility?153  Ivi II left 
its inquiry at “unclear,” but acknowledged that the Internet is not a 
“tangible entity” that is required of a physical facility.154  FilmOn DC 
stated the Internet could not be a facility as defined by section 
111(f)(3).155 
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The definition of a cable system on its face requires: (1) there to 
be a facility that “receives” the broadcasters’ signals; (2) that that 
facility be located in a state or territory; and (3) that the facility 
retransmit the signals via “wires, cables, microwaves, or other 
communication channels to subscribing members of the public.”156  
The definition does not limit cable systems to those that “encompass 
the distribution medium,” nor does it require a system’s 
retransmissions be “direct[].”157 
FilmOn Cal—rather than “focus[ing] on the mysterious ‘ether’” 
(a.k.a. the Internet)—simply found that FilmOn’s “antennas, located in 
particular buildings wholly within particular states,” are the receiving 
facilities in accordance with section 111(f)(3). 158  These facilities then 
retransmit the signals through familiar means, such as “wires, cables, 
microwave, or other communication channels.”159  Therefore, the 
Internet is not the facility here.160  As FilmOn Cal observed, all of the 
electrical instrumentalities—which FilmOn has control over and 
operates—precede the Internet in its operation.161  Therefore, applying 
section 111’s definition of a cable system to the facts, FilmOn’s 
operational facilities that receive the signals, are physically located in 
several states, and retransmit the signals through a prescribed 
communication channel to a localized geographical region.  
Additionally, despite what FilmOn DC held, section 111(f)(3) makes 
no mention of a requirement for signals to be directly retransmitted to 
subscribers.162  Furthermore, even if legislative history purports 
otherwise, history was broken when AT&T Uverse and Verizon Fios 
were granted a section 111(c) compulsory license because they use the 
Internet. 
Next Ivi II and FilmOn DC, agreeing with the Copyright Office, 
stated that the terms “headends” and “contiguous communities,” found 
in the second sentence of the cable system definition, evinced a 
localized service and not a nationwide one.163  But, this should not 
affect the Ninth Circuit’s determination.  First, because as Judge Wu 
held, the second sentence of the definition of cable system is intended 
to distinguish “larger [cable] system[s] for purposes of the royalty 
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determination,” instead of modifying the definition of cable systems.  
Second, even if we were to accept the Second Circuit and DC Court’s 
reading, FilmOn’s service still fits within it, so long as localization 
safeguards exist. 164 
To the first point, larger cable systems are treated as a single one 
to ensure they may contribute larger per-subscriber royalty payments—
this is the extent of this sentence’s purpose.165  To the latter point, 
FilmOn has recently implemented a litany of localization measures and 
Judge Wu granted it the opportunity to display such safeguards on 
appeal.166  So long as it does so, FilmOn will have removed its service 
from the likes of national ones (e.g., satellites, Aereo, and Ivi) and 
rendered itself compatible with the localized intent of section 111. 
ii. Likened to Cable Systems 
Throughout Aereo III, the Supreme Court made undeniable 
comparisons between Aereo’s system and the traditional cable 
systems.167  First, after analyzing the history of the Copyright Act and 
compulsory license, the Court noted Aereo’s activities were 
“substantially similar” to traditional cable systems.168  Immediately 
following this sentence, the Supreme Court cited a House Report, 
which stated a cable system’s main operation is “based on the carriage 
of copyrighted program material.”169  Second, the Supreme Court noted 
that any technological differences between Aereo’s system and cable 
systems—not just traditional cable systems—did not distinguish 
Aereo’s system in general, its commercial objective, nor its 
subscribers’ viewing experience.170 
FilmOn SDNY and Aereo IV dismissed the argument that such 
remarks by the Supreme Court established Internet retransmission 
services as cable systems.171  The courts were correct that this was not 
the holding in Aereo III, however, to simply dismiss the Supreme 
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Court’s unambiguous analogies would be another kind of fallacy.  The 
courts limited the quotes to only bear on the issue of public 
performance for purposes of the Transmit Clause, but their words and 
placement may suggest more.  Firstly, the court in Aereo IV 
mischaracterized the analogies as only pertaining to traditional cable 
systems.  The Supreme Court clearly provided that Internet 
retransmission systems are similar to cable systems in general, have the 
same overall commercial objective, and provide the seam viewing 
experience through its retransmissions.172  Secondly, when examining 
the Transmit Clause, the Supreme Court made clear that the general 
operation of a cable system is no different than Internet retransmission 
systems.173  This is to say that Aereo, and by comparison other Internet 
TV systems, communicate retransmissions to subscribers analogous to 
those cable systems already entitled to compulsory licensing. 
Moreover, the antagonistic broadcast companies even argued in 
Aereo II “that Aereo’s [re]transmissions of broadcast television 
programs . . . are analogous to the retransmissions of network 
programming made by cable systems.”174  The broadcasters would go 
on to declare Aereo’s system was “functionally equivalent to a cable 
television provider.”175 
Given the analogies made by the Supreme Court and the broadcast 
companies, once FilmOn can display its improved localization 
safeguards and compliance with applicable regulations, what more is 
necessary to show it is a cable system?  Indeed “an implication is not a 
holding,”176 but it is a significant connection that the Ninth Circuit 
should take notice of in its impending decision. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Ivi II, FilmOn Cal, and FilmOn DC decisions provide insight 
as to how one statute can be interpreted several different ways.  The 
decision can become more confusing when legislative history from 40 
years ago and an agency’s opinion enter the fray.  FilmOn Cal 
establishes the best, clear-cut interpretation of section 111.  By reading 
the statute for what it is and correctly refraining from the Copyright 
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Office’s discouraging opinion, Judge Wu was able to correctly 
determine that FilmOn’s system is a cable system within the definition 
and would be entitled to a compulsory license following a display of 
its improved measures. 
